EDITORIAL

Int. J. Public Health, 19 November 2026

Volume 71 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/ijph.2026.1610107

Tools without trust: public health diplomacy and the 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in East Africa

  • 1. Department of Health Policy, School of Public Health, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States

  • 2. Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States

Introduction

Public health emergencies test relationships as much as laboratories. On 15 May 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed an outbreak of the Bundibugyo virus in Mongbwalu, Ituri Province, and the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 17 May [1, 2]. As of 2 September 2026, the DRC epidemic had reached 6,342 confirmed cases and 3,072 confirmed deaths [2]. Uganda, by contrast, had successfully interrupted transmission, and both the WHO and Uganda’s Ministry of Health subsequently declared the outbreak over. Nevertheless, Uganda continued to face travel-related restrictions, prompting Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya to call for their removal at the July 2026 African Union health summit [3]. His argument that countries should not be penalized for transparent reporting names the gap this editorial addresses. We use public health diplomacy narrowly: the standing legal and institutional arrangements between neighboring states and their regional blocs that let cross-border responses operate under political stress. The trust at stake is the Ministries of Health’s confidence that transparent reporting will result in regional support rather than unilateral penalties. The expectation of rapid notification under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) is not always matched by protection from its economic and political consequences. Public health diplomacy of this regional kind must be built as peacetime infrastructure, not improvised in an emergency.

This gap is legal, and its consequences extend well beyond data governance. Cross-border surveillance scholarship distinguishes four dimensions of interoperability on which such a response depends: technical, semantic, organizational, and legal [4]. In the Bundibugyo response, East Africa drew on functioning arrangements across the first three. Africa CDC’s genomic platforms circulated sequences between reference laboratories [4, 5]; harmonized case definitions and open standards supported cross-border data exchange [4]; and Uganda’s national Public Health Emergency Operation Centre coordinated operationally with the DRC. What is comparatively under-institutionalized is the legal layer. The existing East African Community (EAC) health sector instruments provide important mechanisms for coordination and surveillance, yet they primarily appear to rely on policy guidance and administrative cooperation rather than on enforceable sub-regional obligations governing outbreak notification, cross-border data exchange, mutual assistance, and dispute resolution during public health emergencies. Where such arrangements are absent, the same technical capacity performs unevenly under political stress.

The collateral damage of IHR compliance is clear: transparency can carry substantial political and economic penalties. Despite Uganda’s prompt reporting and effective containment, third-country quarantine mandates forced KLM to suspend Entebbe flights on 1 June 2026. This suspension occurred even as the airline conceded that the outbreak posed no direct risk [6]. The Africa CDC subsequently argued that restrictions should be evidence-based, proportionate, regularly reviewed, and that blanket measures divert movement toward informal and unmonitored routes, potentially increasing public health risks rather than reducing them [7]. Together, these developments reveal a recurring dilemma in global outbreak governance: when transparency is associated with economic or mobility penalties, incentives for timely reporting may be weakened, potentially undermining the objectives of the IHR. Public health diplomacy is therefore not supplementary to outbreak control; it is one of the conditions that enables it.

These arrangements would not, on their own, resolve every determinant of outbreak response. Financing, workforce capacity, community engagement, and biomedical countermeasure development remain decisive factors [8]. In July 2026, the Africa CDC estimated that approximately USD 1.4 billion was required for containment [9], while pledged support has been slow to arrive, and workforce disruptions have complicated response efforts in Ituri [10]. Regional legal architecture cannot substitute for these investments. It can, however, provide a more reliable framework through which they are coordinated and deployed across borders.

The Bundibugyo outbreak suggests that, in addition to persistent resource and capacity constraints, a substantial gap remains in the legal and institutional framework governing cross-border cooperation. Existing instruments, the IHR (2005), EAC Health Sector protocols, and Africa CDC’s continental initiatives, provide political scaffolding, but they do not, individually, generate binding sub-regional obligations between neighboring states that are most likely to share an outbreak. An EAC Joint Operations Compact for cross-border pathogens, formalized as an amendment to existing EAC health instruments rather than as a parallel body, could close that gap: it would be triggered by notification from any EAC Ministry of Health or by a WHO PHEIC; it would be overseen by the EAC Council of Health Ministers through a dedicated Secretariat; and it would be operationalized across the four interoperability dimensions, including a no-blanket-restriction solidarity clause on early notification. Africa CDC’s August 2024 mpox declaration showed that regional incentive structures can reward early notification [5]. Kaseya’s Ghana appeal articulated the political imperative. If countries that comply with international reporting obligations continue to bear disproportionate costs, the credibility of the global outbreak notification system may be eroded.

Statements

Author contributions

MM and MS conceptualized the editorial and drafted and finalized the manuscript. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they do not have any conflicts of interest.

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The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.

Any alternative text (alt text) provided alongside figures in this article has been generated by Frontiers with the support of artificial intelligence and reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, including review by the authors wherever possible. If you identify any issues, please contact us.

Correction note

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the scientific content of the article.

References

Summary

Keywords

capacity building, cross-border surveillance, diplomacy, East African community, Ebola virus disease

Citation

Muhoozi M and Swahn MH (2026) Tools without trust: public health diplomacy and the 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in East Africa. Int. J. Public Health 71:1610107. doi: 10.3389/ijph.2026.1610107

Received

23 June 2026

Revised

07 September 2026

Accepted

12 November 2026

Published

19 November 2026

Corrected

23 November 2026

Volume

71 - 2026

Edited by

Gabriel Gulis, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

Updates

Copyright

*Correspondence: Michael Muhoozi,

This Editorial is part of the IJPH Special Issue “Public Health Diplomacy in a Complex World”

Disclaimer

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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